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IN MEMORIAM
On November 6, 2017 53-
year-old Abbotsford Police 
Department Constable  John 
Davidson was killed in the 
line of duty. The Abbotsford 
Pol ice Department was 
responding to a report of a 
possible  stolen vehicle in the 
parking lot of a  shopping 
complex. Shots were fired in 
the direction of the  general public by the suspect 
and multiple 911 calls were received by police.
As police arrived at the scene shots were fired. It 
was at this time that Constable Davidson was 
fatally wounded. The suspect then fled in the 
s to len veh ic le and was subsequen t l y 
apprehended by police. Oscar Arfmann, 65, of 
Alberta was charged with Constable Davidson’s 
murder.
Constable Davidson had worked as a police 
officer for 24 years. He began his law 
enforcement career in the United Kingdom 
working for the Northumbria Police from 1993 to 
2005. In 2006 he was hired by the Abbotsford 
Police Department and worked in the Patrol, 
Youth Squad and Traffic sections. Recently, he 
completed the Tour de Valley Cops for Cancer 
ride. Constable Davidson was a dedicated police 
officer who devoted much of his time to 
connecting with the  community and helping 
kids. He is survived by his wife and three adult 
children. 
~ Constable John Davidson #386 ~
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Highlights In This Issue
What’s New For Police In The Library 3
Training & Experience Key Factors In Assessing 
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4
Driver Not Compelled To Empty Pocket: Arrest & 
Search Lawful
6
Nervousness + Air Freshener + Slight Marihuana Odour 
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Lawful
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced Police Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC Police Academy
See Course List here.
Note-able Quote
“Law: the only game where the best 
players get to sit on the bench.”
Unknown
“John Davison is my hero. 
He’s this community’s hero. We 
train our police officers, we ask 
our police officers that when 
somebody is putting peoples 
lives at danger, when there’s an 
active shooter we no longer wait 
for cover, we no longer set up 
teams, the first person in goes. 
John Davison was the first 
person in and away he went. 
And he died protecting you and 
me.”   
Abbotsford Police Department Chief Constable Bob Rich. 
Remarks, press briefing , November 7, 2017.
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Addictive substances and neurological disease: 
alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, and drugs of abuse in 
everyday lifestyles.
Edited by Ronald Ross Watson & Sherma Zibadi.
London, UK; San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2017.
RC 564 A33 2017
Are you fully charged? the 3 keys to energizing 
your work and life.
Tom Rath.
Arlington, VA: Silicon Guild, 2015.
BF 204.6 R378 2015
Bullying among older adults: how to recognize 
and address an unseen epidemic.
Robin P. Bonifas, Ph. D., M.S.W.
Baltimore, MD: Health Professions Press, Inc., 2016.
BF 637 B85 B65 2016
Collaborating with the enemy: how to work with 
people you don't agree with or like or trust.
Adam Kahane; drawings by Jeff Barnum.
Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2017.
HD 30.3 K34 2017
Coaching and mentoring: practical techniques for 
developing learning and performance.
Eric Parsloe & Melville Leedham.
New York, NY: Kogan Page Ltd, 2017.
HF 5549.5 C53 P27 2017
Decision making in disaster response: strategies 
for frontline humanitarian responders.
J.S. Tipper.
Auckland, NZ: Relief Advisory International, 2016.
HV 551.2 T57 2016
Deep leadership: essential insights from high-risk 
environments.
Joe MacInnis.
Toronto, ON: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2012.
HM 1261 M335 2012
Enhancing adult motivation to learn: a 
comprehensive guide for teaching all adults.
Raymond J. Wlodkowski & Margery B. Ginsberg.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, A Wiley  Brand, 
2017.
LC 5219 W53 2017
From witches to crack moms : women, drug law, 
and policy.
Susan C. Boyd, Faculty of Human and Social 
Development, University of Victoria, BC.
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2015.
HV 5824 W6 B686 2015
Great answers to tough interview questions.
Martin John Yate.
London, UK: Kogan Page, 2017.
HF 5549.5 I6 Y27 2017
How to lie with charts.
Gerald Everett Jones.
Santa Monica, CA: LaPuerta, 2015.
HF 5718.22 J66 2015
Peer pressure, peer prevention: the role of friends 
in crime and conformity.
Barbara J. Costello & Trina L. Hope.
New York, NY; London, UK: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2016.
HM 1246 C67 2016
Show & tell: how everybody can make 
extraordinary presentations.
Dan Roam.
New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin, 2016.
HF 5718.22 R629 2016
The stress test: how pressure can make you 
stronger and sharper.
Ian Robertson.
New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2017.
BF 575 S75 R579 2017
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TRAINING & EXPERIENCE KEY 
FACTORS IN ASSESSING 
REASONABLE SUSPICION
R. v. Danielson, 2017 ABCA 422
 
At 7:30 am on a bitterly  cold winter 
day a police  officer assigned to the 
Roving Traffic Unit, in company his 
trained narcotic  detection dog, 
stopped the accused driving a rental 
vehicle on a highway near Lake Louise, Alberta to 
check his driver’s licence and fatigue level. During 
the interaction, the officer noticed that the accused 
was unusually  nervous and he had provided a 
suspect explanation for why he was driving to 
Calgary and how long he had been driving without 
a break. The officer ran a computer check on the 
accused and the officer learned he had prior 
involvement in drug-related matters, which 
included a relatively  recent conviction for 
possessing a Schedule 1 drug. At this point, the 
officer concluded that he had reasonable grounds 
to suspect the accused was transporting a 
controlled substance. The officer had his drug-
detecting dog walk around and search the exterior 
of the vehicle. The dog’s behaviour caused the 
officer to believe that the accused had drugs in the 
vehicle for personal use. The accused was arrested, 
the vehicle searched and three kilograms of 
cocaine was found hidden in the trunk.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The officer testified that his initial reason 
for deciding to stop the vehicle was a 
concern about driver fatigue. Then, after 
he ran the licence plate, he discovered 
that the accused was driving a rental vehicle. He 
said he also wanted to ensure the driver had a valid 
licence.
The accused argued that the initial stop was not a 
random stop under Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act (TSA) 
to check for fatigue and licences but rather a stop 
designed to detect drugs. As well, he claimed that 
there  was no objectively  reasonable basis for his 
subsequent detention and the search using the drug 
sniffing dog. In his view, his ss. 8 (unreasonable 
search and seizure) and 9 (arbitrary detention) 
Charter rights were breached.
The judge, however, found that the officer had a 
legitimate traffic safety purpose for stopping the 
accused’s vehicle. The stop was lawful and the 
officer acquired the  necessary  reasonable suspicion 
to justify detaining the accused and deploying his 
dog for the drug search. The accused was convicted 
of possessing cocaine of the purpose of trafficking. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in finding that 
his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights 
w e r e n o t b r e a ch e d . H e 
submitted that the initial vehicle stop was not valid 
under the TSA because the officer used the stop for 
the impermissible screening of criminal activity. 
The Court of Appeal found the officer’s reasons for 
making a TSA stop were not inconsistent nor did 
the surrounding circumstances cast doubt on the 
officer’s evidence regarding his motivation for 
stopping the vehicle. The trial judge made no error 
in holding that the officer had a legitimate traffic 
safety purpose for deciding to stop the accused’s 
vehicle.
The accused also contended that the officer’s 
subjective belief that there were reasonable 
grounds to suspect that he had drugs in the vehicle 
could not be justified on an objective basis. 
Although Crown counsel conceded that this was a 
close call, the Court of Appeal concluded the 
objective bar had been cleared:
“[A]ll the facts do not have to lead the 
objective monitor to conclude that the 
target must have committed or more likely 
than not has committed a crime. The 
degree-of-certainty standard is much 
lower: ‘Are the facts objectively indicative 
of the possibility of criminal behaviour in 
light of the totality of the circumstances?’”
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We are satisfied that the trial judge’s conclusion 
that the notional objective observer – “a 
reasonable person armed with the knowledge, 
training and experience of the investigating 
officer”– would have determined that the 
officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that 
[the accused] had marijuana in the vehicle is 
correct.
In making this assessment, we are mindful of 
five important principles.
First, Canada is a free country. A person, in 
most circumstances, is free to go where he or 
she pleases when he or she pleases. Canadians 
cherish freedom of movement.
Second, all the facts do not have to lead the 
objective monitor to conclude that the target 
must have committed or more likely than not 
has committed a crime. The degree-of-certainty 
standard is much lower: “Are the facts 
objectively indicative of the possibility of 
criminal behaviour in light of the totality of the 
circumstances?”
Third, one must remember that the decision 
under review is made by a front-line officer 
without the benefit of argument presented by 
skilled advocates and the luxury of deliberative 
time. The detainee is entitled to his freedom 
and should not be delayed longer than is 
reasonably necessary.
Fourth, the objective observer is not devoid of 
common sense. This is not an insignificant 
factor. Common sense provides considerable 
guidance when assessing the reasonableness of 
front-line police decisions.
Fifth, the objective observer’s assessment is 
based on all the information that the officer 
took into account. That each fact may not have 
been the basis for a reasonable suspicion is not 
the test. [footnotes omitted, paras. 11-17]
In this case, the Court of Appeal found the trial 
judge, in focusing on the key facts that an objective 
observer must consider, correctly  held that the 
officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
accused was in possession of drugs and was 
entitled to deploy the police dog:
The [accused’s] continuing level of nervousness 
and the manner in which he responded to 
questions during his roadside interaction 
caused the officer to access the information 
bank available to him and acquire more 
information about [the accused]. His initial 
assessment was that the explanation for these 
unusual facts might be criminal acts on the part 
of the driver. But his training precluded him 
from characterizing his suspicion as reasonable 
at this preliminary stage of the investigation. A 
reasonable observer would have made the 
same assessment. The computer check revealed 
that the [accused] had a relatively recent 
conviction for drug possession, along with 
other possible drug involvement. Although that 
information contained some errors and 
duplicity, the correct information would still 
have demonstrated some recent prior drug 
involvement. This additional data gave the 
officer a reasonable basis for his suspicion.
The officer’s knowledge, training and 
experience are key factors in this case. The 
officer had extensive experience working on a 
traffic unit, had conducted thousands of traffic 
stops and hundreds of drug investigations 
throughout his career, and his years of 
exper ience helped him to determine 
behaviours and patterns consistent with 
criminal activity. Things that might seem neutral 
to a lay person had more significance to this 
officer. [paras. 19-20]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional facts taken from a voire dire 
ruling dated April 14, 2016, Docket: 140150038Q1.
“[O]ne must remember that the decision under review is made by a front-line officer without the 
benefit of argument presented by skilled advocates and the luxury of deliberative time. The 
detainee is entitled to his freedom and should not be delayed longer than is reasonably 
necessary.”
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DRIVER NOT COMPELLED 
TO EMPTY POCKET: 
ARREST & SEARCH LAWFUL
R. v. Aujla, 2017 ABCA 379
 
After being stopped by members of 
the gang suppression team for 
speeding, the accused produced the 
vehicle registration and insurance 
documents, but he was unable  to 
produce his driver’s licence. He told police he did 
not have his licence with him. An officer standing 
on the passenger side of the vehicle noticed a 
square  object that he thought was a wallet in the 
right thigh pocket of the  accused’s pants. He told 
the officer at the driver’s door that the accused had 
a wallet in his pocket and to have him check it. The 
officer on the driver’s side asked the accused twice 
to look for identification inside the wallet in his 
right pants pocket. The officer on the passenger side 
saw the accused put his hand in his pocket twice. 
When the accused removed his hand from his 
pocket the second time, the passenger side officer 
noticed a little corner of a clear baggie with 
fentanyl pills it it.
The accused was arrested 
for possessing  a controlled 
substance, and he and his 
vehicle  were searched. 
Police located a plastic bag 
containing 454 fentanyl pills in the right thigh 
pocket of his pants. As well, police discovered 
additional evidence in their search including 1.867 
kgs of cocaine, 769 g of heroin, 410 g of 
methamphetamine, four cell phones, four scales, 
packaging material, two unloaded handguns and 
body armour, and $31,000 cash. 
Alberta Provincial Court
The accused testified that the police 
ordered, ins t ructed, directed or 
commanded him to empty his pockets. 
In his view, by compelling him to 
produce the bag without having the lawful 
authority to do so the police breached this s. 8 and 
s. 9 Charter rights. 
The officer on the driver’s side denied asking the 
accused what was in his right pocket, denied ever 
asking the accused to remove the contents of either 
pocket, and denied the accused ever produced 
what was inside either pocket except following his 
arrest. The officer standing on the passenger side  of 
the vehicle testified they asked him to look in his 
wallet and pointed to his right pocket but denied 
demanding  that the accused take out the contents 
of his right pocket or ever produce anything.
The judge rejected the accused’s evidence and 
concluded that the police did not violate ss. 8 or 9 
of the Charter. Although he was concerned that the 
police likely had more than one reason to stop the 
accused, the judge found the officer observed a 
little  corner of the  bag of fentanyl pills that became 
visible when the accused pulled his empty hand 
out of his pocket. The accused did not empty either 
pocket. This exposure of the  bag triggered the arrest 
and subsequent search of the accused and the 
vehicle. 
The accused was convicted of 11 firearms and drug 
related charges including possessing heroin, 
cocaine, methamphetamine and fentanyl, all for the 
purposes of trafficking, and possessing unlicenced 
handguns and body armour. He was sentenced to 7 
years’ imprisonment (less time served), given a 
$200 victim fine surcharge on each of the Criminal 
LEGALLY SPEAKING
Fentanyl
“Once an insidious killer of opioid 
users, the drug fentanyl has 
emerged to become a notorious 
Grim Reaper stalking the streets 
of Canada’s cities and towns.  Anyone reading or 
watching the news understands that fentanyl use 
has become a serious public health crisis to which 
governments and law enforcement agencies are 
attempting to respond.” - Justice Van Harten in R. v. 
Aujla, 2016 ABPC 272 at para 1. 
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

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    
  

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


 
 


       



 
 

        

 
 
 
 


         

 
 

    

        

 
 
        


 
 
 
 



   
      

 


        

        

       



 

          







      

      




        
       



    

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Code  and CDSA offence, ordered to provide a 
sample of his DNA, prohibited from possessing 
firearms and ammunition for a period of 10 years 
and the contraband seized was forfeited to the 
Crown.
Alberta Court of Appeal 
The accused challenged his 
conviction contending, in part, 
that the search was not 
authorized by law. In his view, 
he would not have produced the bag containing 
the 454 fentanyl pills unless he was compelled to 
do so.
The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed the 
accused’s arguments. The trial judge properly 
concluded that the accused was not compelled by 
police to empty his pockets in order to produce 
some other form of identification. The Appeal Court 
found the search was authorized by law. It stated:
Even though the trial judge did not expressly 
say so, it is obvious he accepted the evidence 
of the police officers that they did not directly 
or indirectly compel the [accused] to produce 
the contents of his pocket, that they believed 
the [accused] had a wallet in his pocket that 
might have conta ined some form of 
identification, and that at no time did the 
[accused] empty his pockets under compulsion. 
Rather, the [accused’s] arrest was triggered 
upon [the officer on the passenger side] 
noticing a small corner of a bag containing 
drugs when the [accused] removed his hand 
from his pant pocket. [para. 13]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional facts taken from R. v. Aujla, 
2016 ABPC 272 and the voire dire ruling Docket: 
151383502P1)
Note-able Quote
“New laws are followed by new tricks.” 
- German Proverb
NERVOUSNESS + AIR 
FRESHENER + SLIGHT 
MARIHUANA ODOUR = RGB
R. v. Lotfy, 2017 BCCA 418
After stopping the accused for 
speeding in his truck at 12:21 pm, the 
officer approached its driver’s side. The 
driver’s window was down and the 
accused was alone. The officer told the accused he 
had been stopped for speeding and asked him for 
his driver’s licence, which was produced.  The 
officer felt that accused appeared to be more 
nervous than usual for a person stopped for 
speeding. While standing by the open driver’s 
window the officer detected an extremely strong 
odour of air  freshener emanating from the truck.  
He believed the air freshener to have been recently 
sprayed and the odour was so strong that it would 
have caused the  officer to have a headache had he 
been travelling in the truck. The officer saw an air 
freshener device clipped to one of the air vents 
near the radio on the truck’s dashboard.
The officer returned to his vehicle where he 
remained for about nine minutes while  he wrote 
out a speeding ticket and conducted a CPIC 
inquiry. The officer learned that a few months 
earlier the accused had been arrested for possessing 
a large quantity of marihuana. Upon returning to 
the accused’s truck, the officer detected a slight 
odour of vegetative marihuana emanating from it. 
The accused was arrested for possessing 
marihuana, advised of his rights and placed in the 
back of the police vehicle. The officer then 
searched the truck and found two air fresheners and 
three  cellular telephones in the front cabin area. In 
the back seat area, police found a hockey bag 
containing about 20 lbs. of marihuana and a 
reusable grocery bag containing about 10 lbs. of 
marihuana. The accused was re-arrested for 
possessing marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
and was again advised him of his rights. 
At 12:50 pm, the  officer began making notes of the 
incident in his personal notebook.  He recorded 
“odour of fresh marihuana” in the notebook but 
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made no note of the accused’s nervousness or the 
air freshener odour. Later that day, in the  synopsis 
section of his Report to Crown the officer 
mentioned the odour of vegetative marihuana 
coming from inside the  vehicle but he did not 
mention the  accused’s nervousness or the air 
freshener. Then, even later, the officer prepared a 
computerized occurrence report in which he 
referenced the accused’s nervousness and odour of 
air freshener.  
The accused was charged with possessing 
marihuana over three kilograms for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The officer testified that by  reason of his 
experience he was able to distinguish 
the odour of vegetative marihuana from 
that of burnt or burning marihuana. As 
well, the officer stated his grounds for arrest were 
based on the accused’s unusual nervousness,  the 
strong odour of air freshener detected when he first 
spoke with him and the slight odour of vegetative 
marihuana detected when he spoke with him the 
second time. The officer also said that he did not 
rely on the CPIC information about the accused’s 
earlier arrest as part of his reasonable grounds.
The accused submitted that the officer lacked the 
requisite reasonable grounds for the arrest and the 
incidental search that followed was unlawful. In his 
view, the officer’s evidence should not be accepted 
because  he had not recorded the accused’s unusual 
nervousness and the strong odour of air freshener in 
either his notebook or the synopsis. The Crown, on 
the other hand, contended that the officer’s failure 
to record the accused’s unusual nervousness and 
the strong odour of air freshener in his notes or the 
synopsis should not detract from his testimony that 
those factors formed part of the factual matrix 
considered in making the decision to arrest under s. 
495(1) of the Criminal Code. 
The judge found the officer’s decision to arrest the 
accused was based on reasonable grounds that he 
was in possession of some amount of vegetative 
marihuana. These grounds included the accused’s 
exceptional nervousness and the  extreme volume 
of air freshener detected in his pickup when he was 
first pulled over, combined with the odour of 
vegetative marihuana on the second visit to the 
truck. As for not recording the accused’s 
nervousness and the strong odour of air freshener in 
either his notebook or the  synopsis, the  judge 
concluded this did not render the officer’s evidence 
unreliable.  “In a  perfect world, an officer’s notes 
and synopsis would be all-inclusive,” said the 
judge. “However, the fact that they lack  relevant 
information does not lead automatically to the 
result that oral testimony including such 
information is to be rejected.”  He continued:
[T]he absence of notation about nervousness 
and the air freshener in two of the three 
documents is not enough for me to reject [the 
officer’s] oral testimony about his grounds for 
arrest. There is no inconsistency between what 
[the officer] wrote and what he said in the 
course of the voir dire, and there is no 
inconsistency on this point among the three 
documents the constable prepared. An 
omission is not the same as an inconsistency.  
While some omissions in a document, in some 
contexts, can be fatal to the acceptance of the 
related oral testimony, the two omissions here 
are not of that nature.  The essential point in of 
[sic] all [the officer’s] documentation was that 
he smelled marihuana. The fact that his 
decision to arrest was also grounded in [the 
accused’s] nervousness and the air freshener 
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Arrest without warrant by peace 
officer
s. 495 (1) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he believes has 
committed or is about to commit an indictable offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence; 
or ...
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was recorded where one would most readily 
expect to find it, namely, in the relatively 
detailed occurrence report.
The judge found the  officer to be a credible and 
reliable  witness. The accused’s arrest was lawful, 
the search reasonable and the accused was 
convicted of possessing marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing, in part, that 
the trial judge erred in assessing 
the officer’s reliability and in 
finding his arrest lawful.
Lawful Arrest
The onus rested on the 
Crown to demonstrate that 
the officer had the requisite 
grounds to make the arrest 
under s. 495(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Code. The accused 
was not required to prove that the officer did not 
have the grounds to do so. Justice Frankel, 
delivering the opinion for the Court of Appeal 
stated:
It is well-established that when an accused 
challenges the validity of a warrantless arrest 
the burden is on the Crown to show the police 
acted in a lawful and reasonable manner. To do 
so, the Crown must prove the facts on which it 
relies on a balance of probabilities.
When an arrest has been made pursuant to 
s.  495(1)(b) of the Criminal Code the Crown 
must establish that the arresting officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe the person 
arrested was committing a criminal offence in 
the officer’s presence...
A two-part test is applied in determining the 
validity of a warrantless arrest.  In the context of 
s.  495(1)(b) the first stage involves factual 
determinations: (a) whether the arresting officer 
subjectively believed the person arrested was 
committing a criminal offence in the officer’s 
presence; and (b)  the grounds for such belief, 
i.e., the factual matrix that informed the 
officer’s decision.
If the Crown proves the officer held the 
requisite subjective belief, then the second 
stage involves determining whether the officer’s 
grounds for that belief are objectively 
reasonable. This is a question of law. It involves 
determining whether, from an objective 
perspective, it was reasonable for the officer to 
believe he or she had come across someone in 
the very act of committing a criminal offence.  
The officer’s training and experience are 
relevant in assessing objective reasonableness.  
[references omitted, paras. 32-35]
Moreover, the  accused was conflating the approach 
to be taken in assessing an officer's reasonable 
grounds with that which applied to determining 
whether Crown had proven their case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Instead, the Court of Appeal 
noted, “the reasonable grounds standard—whether 
in the context of suspicion or belief—requires 
“It is well-established that when an accused challenges the validity of a warrantless arrest 
the burden is on the Crown to show the police acted in a lawful and reasonable manner. 
To do so, the Crown must prove the facts on which it relies on a balance of probabilities.”
“A two-part test is applied in determining the validity of a warrantless arrest.  In the 
context of s. 495(1)(b) the first stage involves factual determinations: (a) whether the 
arresting officer subjectively believed the person arrested was committing a criminal 
offence in the officer’s presence; and (b) the grounds for such belief, i.e., the factual 
matrix that informed the officer’s decision.”
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consideration of the totality of the circumstances, 
including exculpatory, neutral, or equivocal 
information of which the police are aware.  The 
police are not required to speculate as to the 
possible  existence of other facts which could 
provide an innocent explanation for the facts 
known to them.” 
Here, the trial judge concluded that the officer 
possessed both the subjective  belief that the 
accused was in possession of marihuana and the 
basis for that belief was objectively reasonable.
Justice Frankel agreed:
In the present case, [the officer] based his 
decision to arrest [the accused] on the 
following facts (i.e., grounds):
(a) [the accused] was the sole occupant of a 
truck stopped for speeding;
(b) [the accused] appeared more nervous than 
usual for someone stopped for speeding;
(c) initially, an extremely strong odour of air 
freshener emanated from the truck; and
(d) several minutes later, the slight odour of 
vegetative marihuana emanated from the 
truck.
Evaluating those facts on a practical, common 
sense, and non-technical basis, I am of the 
view [the officer’s] subjective belief that [the 
accused] was in possession of marihuana is 
objectively reasonable. [paras. 66-67]
Credibility and Reliability
The accused suggested that the officer’s failure to 
record his unusual nervousness and the odour of air 
freshener in his notebook impugned the officer’s 
credibility and reliability. In his view, the trial judge 
erred in not having regard to the “duty” police 
officers have  to make contemporaneous notes. Even 
assuming that the officer was under a legal duty to 
make notes, the Court of Appeal - in rejecting this 
argument - stated:
That a discrepancy exists between a police 
officer’s testimony and what is recorded in his 
or her notebook is something a trier of fact has 
to consider and weigh in deciding whether to 
accept the officer’s testimony.  Each case will 
depend on its own facts.  However, the 
credibility / reliability analysis will be the same 
whether an affirmative legal duty to make notes 
exists or not. [para. 49]
And further:
The trial judge recognized that a witness’s 
failure to record a matter in a contemporaneous 
document is a factor to be considered in 
deciding whether to accept the witness’s 
testimony concerning that matter. After taking 
into consideration the fact that [the officer] had 
not recorded [the accused’s] unusual 
nervousness or the strong odour of air freshener 
in either his notebook or the synopsis, the 
judge accepted the officer’s testimony with 
respect to those matters. I see no error in the 
approach the judge took. [para. 54]
The accused’s arrest was lawful, the search of his 
truck was conducted incidental to that arrest and 
the accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[T]he reasonable grounds standard—whether in the context of suspicion or belief—
requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including exculpatory, neutral, 
or equivocal information of which the police are aware.  The police are not required to 
speculate as to the possible existence of other facts which could provide an innocent 
explanation for the facts known to them.”
“If the Crown proves the officer held the 
requisite subjective belief, then the 
second stage involves determining 
whether the officer’s grounds for that 
belief are objectively reasonable.” 
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS ON THE RISE 6.0
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2017 to October 31, 
2017. In October there were 96 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This represents a 26% increase 
over the number of deaths occurring in October 
2016. This amounts to about three (3) people  dying 
every day of the month.
From January  1 to October 31, 2017 there were a 
total of 1,208 illicit drug overdose deaths. This is a 
76% increase over the same period last year.
Last year, there were 985 overdose deaths, more 
than a 90% increase over the same period in 2015 
and a 266% over 2012. Moreover, the  report 
attributes fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the 
increase in deaths. In December 2016 alone, there 
were 162 deaths. This was the highest recorded 
number of deaths occurring in a single month in 
BC and was more than double the  monthly average 
of illicit drug overdose deaths since 2015. 
People aged 30-39 have been the hardest hit so far 
in 2017 with 332 illicit drug overdose deaths 
followed by  40-49 year-olds at 292 deaths and 
50-59 year-olds at 246 deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 300 followed by Surrey (148), 
Victoria (78), Kelowna (66), Nanaimo (43) and 
Abbotsford (42). 
Males continue to die at almost a 5:1 ratio 
compared to females. From January to October 
2017, 995 males have died while there were 213 
female deaths.
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The data  indicates that most illicit drug overdose 
deaths (87.3%) occurred inside while 12.1% 
occurred outside. For seven (7) deaths, the  location 
was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
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DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 18 months preceding the 
declaration (Sep 2014-Mar 2016) 
totaled 859. The  number of deaths 
in the  15 months following the 
declaration (April 2016-Oct 
2017) totaled 1,972. This is 
an increase of 130%.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top four detected drugs relevant to illicit drug 
overdose deaths from 2016 and 2017 were 
fentanyl, which was detected in 67.4% of deaths, 
c o c a i n e ( 4 8 . 2 % ) , h e r o i n ( 3 3 . 1 % ) a n d 
methamphetamine/amphetamine (33.1%). 
From January to October 2017, fentanyl was 
detected in 83% (999) of illicit drug overdose 
deaths. This is a 136% increase in which fentanyl 
was detected in deaths occurring during the same 
period in 2016 where fentanyl was detected in 423 
deaths.
According to Vancouver Coastal Health, drugs 
users at Insite  - a supervised injection site - checked 
their drugs more than 1,400 times from July 2016 
to July 2017. Overall, 80% of the drugs checked 
were positive for fentanyl, including 84% of heroin 
samples and 65%  of non-opiate drugs like crystal 
meth and cocaine.
Sources: 
-Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2017 to October 31, 
2017.  
-Fentanyl Detected Apparent Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths, 
2012-2107 YTD. 
Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief Coroner. December 11, 2017.
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CO-HABITANT CONSENT 
INFORMED & VOLUNTARY:
SEARCH LAWFUL
R. v. Parsons, 2017 NLCA 64
 
The police took possession, from 
Canada Post, of a package found to 
contain 305.4 grams of 73% pure 
cocaine.  The police replaced the 
cocaine with another substance and 
added a silent electronic  alarm and a tracking 
device.  The package was tracked and subsequently 
found to be located inside the accused’s apartment. 
The police saw the  accused leave his residence 
carrying a camping-type cooler chest which he 
placed in the  trunk of a car. The police asked the 
accused to open the trunk and he complied when 
the officers produced a general warrant.  The 
package that replaced the cocaine was found in the 
cooler and the accused was arrested and taken to 
police cells. 
At about the same time, a woman named Ms. 
Jennings, who cohabited with the accused at the 
time, came out of the apartment. She was detained 
and returned to the apartment with police. Ms. 
Jennings was arrested for possessing cocaine and 
given the appropriate cautions and rights.  She 
decided not to contact a lawyer. Ms. Jennings gave 
a statement to the police saying she was not 
involved in any illegal drug transactions and was 
not aware of any illegal drugs in the apartment. 
Ms. Jennings was asked if she would consent to the 
police conducting a search of the apartment.  She 
was told that the police were  looking for drugs, 
money and documents and that they could obtain a 
search warrant if necessary. Ms. Jennings gave her 
verbal consent to the search, but the officers did 
not proceed until she  had signed a Consent to 
Search form. Ms. Jennings told the  police she was 
in a relationship with the accused and that they 
had shared occupancy of and expenses for the 
apartment. Weigh scales and $4,520 in cash were 
found in the apartment. The accused was jointly 
charged with another man with conspiring to traffic 
in cocaine.
Newfoundland & Labrador Supreme Court
At trial, both officers testified that they 
expected a search warrant would have 
been authorized by a judge had it been 
necessary  to get one. The judge found 
Ms. Jennings could consent to the search of the 
apartment she shared with the accused. The judge 
stated:
Ms. Jennings was a co-occupant and had 
authority over the premises.   She was a tenant 
and the only person named on the lease.   Ms. 
Jennings shared all areas of the apartment in 
common with [the accused].
…
Ms. Jennings gave a search consent in the 
context of knowing that [the accused] had just 
been arrested in relation to suspected drug 
activity; knowing that she had just been 
arrested in relation to the same activity; 
knowing that the purpose of the search was for 
drugs, documents and cash; knowing she had 
the right to withhold her consent; and knowing 
she had the right to insist on a warrant.   She 
gave her consent voluntarily with knowledge 
that anything found could be used as evidence 
of a criminal, federal or provincial offence.  
The search was therefore lawful. The judge then 
found that the only  rational inference  and 
conclusion to be drawn is that there was a 
conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and that the 
accused, along with the other man, were members 
of that conspiracy.  The accused was convicted of 
conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and he was 
sentenced to 25 months imprisonment.  
Newfoundland & Labrador Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing, among 
other grounds, that the trial 
judge erred in his analysis 
regrading the search of a dwelling-house upon the 
consent of a cohabitant. Even though the accused 
was cohabiting with Ms. Jennings and it was she 
who gave the police permission to search the 
apartment, the accused submitted that she could 
not give permission for the search on his behalf. 
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Co-Habitant Consent Search   
In quoting from the recent Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision in R. v. Reeves, 2017 ONCA 365, Justice 
Welsh, speaking for the  Newfoundland & Labrador 
Court of Appeal, found there was a distinction 
drawn between shared and private areas of a 
residence, and that the nature of the  living 
arrangements may affect a  person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. In Reeves, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal articulated a two-staged inquiry  for co-
habitant consent: 
1. Would the accused reasonably expect that his 
or her co-resident would have the power to 
consent to police entry into a common space; 
and 
2. If so, did the co-resident actually consent? 
The Reeves court noted that the specific facts and 
circumstances will drive the answer to both of 
those questions.
Justice Welsh concluded that the trial judge did not 
err in determining that Ms. Jennings had authority 
to give permission for the search and that her 
consent was both informed and voluntary. Further, 
“the police waited to conduct the search until after 
Ms. Jennings consented in writing, which occurred 
after some time had passed so that she had an 
opportunity to reconsider her position before 
granting permission for the search.  Ms. Jennings 
maintained her innocence throughout and had an 
interest in being forthright and cooperative with the 
police.” There was no s. 8 Charter breach. 
The accused’s appeal against conviction was 
dismissed but his sentence was varied to two year 
less a  day to be served conditionally along with a 
year of probation. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Words are chameleons which reflect the colour 
of their environment.”
- Judge Learned Hand
POLICE PRESENCE LAWFUL: 
GUN SEIZURES AUTHORIZED BY 
s. 489(2) CCC
R. v. Warren, 2017 MBCA 106                 
 
During the early  morning hours 
police responded to a  domestic 
disturbance call at a rural residence.  
The first officer to arrive spoke to the 
accused’s common-law wife outside 
the house.  She told him that the accused was 
intoxicated. She expressed fear for her safety and 
that of her children. She said that there were “lots 
of firearms” in the family residence where the 
accused remained with the children.   The accused 
exited the residence. He approached the officer in 
a highly agitated state and spoke in a belligerent 
manner. Fearing for his safety, the officer called for 
backup officers.  The accused returned to the 
residence. Two additional officers arrived and were 
told of the information conveyed by the  wife. The 
accused again exited the residence and, as a  result 
of his continued belligerent behaviour, was arrested 
“to prevent a further breach of the peace.”
After the accused was arrested, an officer entered 
the residence with the wife’s sister to check  on the 
children.  Upon entering the front door, he saw four 
unsecured firearms and ammunition in a room 
directly  in front of him, which he seized. As a result 
of the seizure, the accused was charged with four 
counts of unlawfully storing an unsecured firearm.  
A gun safe in plain view beside the entry  and 
additional ammunition identified by the wife were 
also seized. The seizure of these last two items did 
not result in any charges.  No other search was 
conducted of the residence. The accused was 
charged with four counts of careless storage of a 
firearm under section 86(2) of the Criminal Code.  
Manitoba Provincial Court
The judge concluded that the seizing 
officer lawfully entered the home to 
ensure  the children’s safety. However, he 
held that after the seizing officer 
observed the firearms his “purpose changed from 
ensuring the safety of the children to evidence 
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gathering as in regards to the firearms.” The judge 
noted that the seizing officer did not remove the 
children (who were asleep on the second floor) 
from the home. “The purpose of the police 
attending the residence was to ensure the safety of 
the children and no more,” said the judge. “[The 
seizing officer] should have removed himself from 
the home and sought the lawful authority to search 
the home, either through the permission of one of 
the homeowners or by way of a warrant. His failure 
to do so was a breach of [the  accused’s] right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure.” 
The warrantless seizure of the four firearms from 
the accused’s residence breached his s. 8 Charter 
right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure 
and the  firearms were  excluded as evidence under 
s. 24(2). The accused was acquitted of the four 
counts of unlawfully storing an unsecured firearm  
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittals and now argued that the 
seizure of the firearms were authorized 
under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code. 
However, the appeal judge ruled that s. 489(2) did 
not apply because the seizing officer was not 
lawfully present in the accused’s home at the time 
he observed the firearms. Once the need to ensure 
the safety  of the children no longer existed the 
seizing officer’s justification for being in the home 
came to an end and he was then under a  duty to 
remove himself from the home and obtain lawful 
authority to search it. The Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown again appealed 
submitting the appeal judge 
erred in upholding the trial 
judge’ finding of a s. 8 Charter 
breach. In the Crown’s view, the  seizing officer was 
initially  lawfully in the house pursuant to his 
common law and statutory duty to ensure the safety 
of the children and was therefore in execution of 
his duties when he observed the firearms, which 
were readily apparent.  Since the firearms were 
unlawfully stored and unsecured, the officer had an 
immediate right to seize them under s. 489(2). 
The accused, on the other hand, argued that the 
entry  to the home was warrantless with the result 
that the onus shifted to the Crown to show that the 
search was otherwise reasonable.  Since the 
purpose of the police presence  in the home 
changed from protection of the children to 
evidence gathering once the seizing officer 
observed the firearms, the police should have 
removed the children from the home, secured the 
residence and applied for a search warrant.  The 
accused also contended that the police could have 
simply  secured the area where the firearms were 
located and left the children in the residence while 
they applied for a warrant.
s. 489(2) Criminal Code
Since the police made the seizure without warrant 
the onus was on the Crown to show that it was 
reasonable.   A search or seizure will be reasonable 
if it is authorized by law, if the law itself is 
reasonable and if the manner in which the search 
or seizure was carried out is reasonable.
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Seizure without warrant
s. 489(2) Every peace officer, and every 
public officer who has been appointed or 
designated to administer or enforce any 
federal or provincial law and whose 
duties include the enforcement of this or any other Act 
of Parliament, who is lawfully present in a place 
pursuant to a warrant or otherwise in the execution of 
duties may, without a warrant, seize any thing that the 
officer believes on reasonable grounds
(a) has been obtained by the commission of an 
offence against this or any other Act of 
Parliament;
(b) has been used in the commission of an offence 
against this or any other Act of Parliament; or
(c) will afford evidence in respect of an offence 
against this or any other Act of Parliament.
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In this case, the police were lawfully in the 
residence. The trial judge had found that the 
original reason for police entry into the residence 
was to ensure  the safety of the children.   “This was 
a domestic dispute where all three adults had been 
consuming alcohol and the police were advised 
that there were unsecured guns ‘laying  around the 
residence’ where young children were present,” 
said Justice Cameron for the  Court of Appeal. 
“There is no serious dispute that, in order to ensure 
the safety of the children, the police had the 
authority to enter the residence for the valid 
purpose of preserving the  public peace, preventing 
crime and protecting life and property.” Neither 
consent nor a warrant was required. Thus, the 
police were lawfully in the residence to ensure the 
safety of the children at the time the firearms were 
observed.
Then, as soon as the  seizing officer entered the 
residence, he observed a  firearm in an open case 
on the floor, a closed firearm case on the floor, a 
firearm on top of a cabinet and a firearm on top of 
a fridge beside a box of ammunition. “The 
observations by the seizing officer and the decision 
to seize the impugned items did not change the fact 
that he was lawfully in the residence,” said Justice 
Cameron.  “It was at the moment that the seizing 
officer observed the unlawfully stored, unsecured 
firearms, that the authority to seize that evidence 
crystalized pursuant to section 489(2)(c) of the 
Code.” The four firearms were lawfully seized 
under s. 489(2).  
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittals were overturned, the seized guns were 
admitted as evidence and convictions on the four 
firearms offences were entered. The  matter was 
then remitted back to the trial judge for sentencing. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
THIRD-PARTY CONSENT TO 
ENTER LAWFUL BUT SEARCH OF 
‘STUFF’ NOT AUTHORIZED
R. v. Clarke, 2017 BCCA 453
 
The accused was a police officer. He 
owned a residence along with his 
mother. A woman, Ms. Ferrer, along 
with her three children, was the 
accused’s tenant and primary 
occupant of the residence. She had a friendship, 
business relationship and sexual relationship with 
the accused. He had his own key and resided there 
intermittently, coming and going as he wished. Ms. 
Ferrer had various concerns about the accused and, 
when she had not seen him for some time, she 
contacted the police. Among other things, the 
woman disclosed that the accused stored 
ammunition in the garage of the residence. 
She met with the police and signed a consent form 
authorizing them to search the residence. The form 
stated that she voluntarily  gave her consent and 
authorized the two named police  officers to search 
“my residence … for the  following goods/items: 
ammunition, any firearms, marihuana and alcohol. 
The items to be searched belong to [the accused] 
and I have control over [them] by virtue of 
‘own’ [selected from a choice of “own, rented, 
borrowed”] since approx. 2007”. The form 
provided that Ms. Ferrer gave her consent 
voluntarily, it could be  withdrawn at any time 
during the search, and reflected her understanding 
that if any of the listed goods were found, they 
“may be subject to seizure, and [she] may be 
arrested, charged and prosecuted.”  
The police conducted a warrantless search of the 
common areas of the residence, together with the 
garage that was accessible from the residence 
through an interior door. Police found an FN FAL 
“The observations by the seizing officer and the decision to seize the impugned items did 
not change the fact that he was lawfully in the residence. It was at the moment that the 
seizing officer observed the unlawfully stored, unsecured firearms, that the authority to 
seize that evidence crystalized pursuant to section 489(2)(c) of the Code.” 
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semi-automatic rifle was found buried in a pile of 
items, covered by a tarp and under a shelf or 
workbench in the  garage. They also found a 
Remington Colt semi-automatic handgun shortly 
thereafter.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge concluded that the accused 
had a privacy interest in the residence, 
although it was a significantly reduced 
privacy interest. Ms. Ferrer testified that 
“everyone” (including her children) had access to 
the items in the garage, including, in one corner, 
what was described as a pile of the accused’s 
outdoor and camping equipment, firearms, 
ammunition and other items. She said that this area 
of the garage, where the pile  was located, was 
“strictly his area”, and that she did not look through 
it. When she found items around the house 
belonging to the accused, she would put them 
either in that part of the garage or a part of the 
closet she also considered his. “The manner in 
which his possessions were left was not indicative 
of a high subjective expectation of privacy,” said 
the judge. “Objectively speaking, one may not 
reasonably conclude that a  high degree of privacy 
attached to them piled in open view in the garage.” 
The judge found the search of the residence and the 
seizure of the items did not violate the accused’s 
s.  8 Charter rights. Although Ms. Ferrer could not 
consent to a search on behalf of the  accused nor 
otherwise  waive his constitutional protection under 
s. 8, the search was of a common area of the 
residence that was lawfully  conducted pursuant to 
Ms. Ferrer’s valid consent. Moreover, even if the 
search breached s. 8 fo the Charter, the judge 
would have admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). 
The firearms seized in the search were admitted as 
evidence and the accused was convicted on two 
counts of possessing  a firearm without a  licence 
and registration certificate, contrary to s.  92(1) of 
the Criminal Code. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that Ms. 
Ferrer’s consent could not 
validly authorize either the 
entry  into the residence or the 
seizure of the firearms because a third party may 
not waive another person’s privacy interest. In the 
accused’s view, the warrantless search of the 
residence, even where he had an overlapping 
privacy interest with Ms. Ferrer, breached s. 8 of the 
“If the police exceeded the effective scope of her consent without justification, the 
[accused’s] reasonable expectation of privacy will have been unlawfully violated.”
PRIVACY
Why the trial judge found the accused had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy:
• Ms.  Ferrer knew that the accused and his mother were 
on title for the residence and she was not.
• The accused would come and go as he chose. He was 
not at the residence every day. They would text and 
sometimes he would let her know he was coming and 
sometimes not.  When the accused was at the residence 
he had access to the whole house. He stayed there part-
time when he wanted to.
• Ms.  Ferrer said the accused “sort-of lives  part-time with 
me”. She said they did not have a set schedule about 
when he would be at the residence, and that he would 
come and go as he wanted.
• Ms.  Ferrer told the police that the accused was “out 
here  all the time,” that he came and went  as he pleased 
and agreed that the residence was “our house”.
• Ms.  Ferrer said the areas that she considered solely the 
accused’s was the area of the garage where his junk 
was. She said it was strictly his and that she did not  look 
through it. Similarly, she said he had a part  of the closet 
and a bedside table. When she found his stuff around 
the house she would put it in either the garage or the 
closet.
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Charter and the evidence of the firearms ought to 
have been excluded under s. 24(2). The Crown, on 
the other hand, contended the warrantless search of 
the common areas of the residence, and the seizure 
of the firearms, was lawfully  authorized by Ms. 
Ferrer’s consent.
Here, the police entered and searched with the 
consent of one of two people who had 
“overlapping” privacy interests. The Court of Appeal 
had to determine whether Ms. Ferrer’s consent was 
effective  to authorize police entry into the 
residence as well as the search and seizure of the 
accused’s property. 
Police Entry
In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the 
trial judge that the accused had a diminished 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the common 
or shared areas of the residence, including the 
garage. He was a “co-resident” of the home only to 
the extent of his intermittent residency there. Ms. 
Ferrer was the primary occupant of the residence. 
The garage was a common area of the house where 
she would park her car. Nevertheless, the accused’s 
diminished expectation of privacy remained 
protected by s. 8 from unauthorized state intrusion. 
Because the police entry was without warrant, it 
was presumptively unreasonable. However, a 
warrantless search may be rendered reasonable 
upon a fully informed and voluntary consent being 
given. Ms. Ferrer had the authority to allow the 
police to enter the residence and to enter the 
common or shared areas of the residence. Justice 
McKenzie, delivering the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal 
analysis on third-party consent in R. v. Reeves, 
2017ONCA 365, and stated:
The Reeves test stipulates that the court, in 
assessing whether a search is reasonable by 
virtue of third-party consent, should look to: 
(a)  whether the accused would reasonably 
expect that a third party would have the power 
to consent to a police search; and (b) whether 
that third party did provide valid consent. This 
two-step analysis must be strictly construed in 
accordance with a purposive and generous 
interpretation of the Charter. Thus, it is 
important here to assess whether the police 
went beyond the permissible scope of the 
consent provided by Ms.  Ferrer, the “co-
resident”, in that both she and the [accused] 
had privacy interests in the residence. If the 
police exceeded the effective scope of her 
consent without justification, the [accused’s] 
reasonable expectation of privacy will have 
been unlawfully violated.
The trial judge’s determination that Ms. Ferrer’s 
consent was voluntary and informed is not 
disputed on this appeal.
The question then remaining under the Reeves 
test is whether the judge erred in determining 
Ms.  Ferrer’s consent effectively authorized the 
police search and seizure of the firearms, i.e. 
whether the [accused] would reasonably 
expect that Ms. Ferrer would have the authority 
to consent to the police search in question.
The [accused] and Ms.  Ferrer had overlapping 
reasonable expectations of privacy in the 
shared spaces of the residence. These privacy 
interests were co-mingled. Given normative 
societal standards, the broader contextual 
circumstances and absent evidence to the 
contrary, the [accused] would reasonably have 
expected Ms.  Ferrer would have the authority 
to consent to police entry into the common 
areas of the house. Ms. Ferrer was the primary 
occupant of the residence. The nature of her 
relationship with the [accused] and their use 
and treatment of the residence, considered in 
the totality of the circumstances, supports the 
conclusion that she could validly consent to 
police entry into the shared or common areas 
of the residence. As held in Reeves, 
“Descriptively, a co-resident knows from the 
outset that the other co-resident has the right to 
invite others into shared spaces.” [reference 
omitted, paras. 51-55]
“[I]n assessing whether a search is reasonable by virtue of third-party consent, should look to: 
(a) whether the accused would reasonably expect that a third party would have the power to 
consent to a police search; and (b) whether that third party did provide valid consent.”
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Although Ms. Ferrer, as a third party, could not  by 
consent or otherwise waive the accused’s 
constitutional rights she could validly authorize the 
police entry into the residence by consent. In this 
case, the  overlapping expectations of privacy 
permitted Ms. Ferrer to consent to police  entry into 
common spaces. Therefore, the  entry into the 
residence was authorized by law.  
Search & Seizure of Accused's ‘Stuff’
The Court of Appeal found that, even though Ms. 
Ferrer’s consent provided lawful authority  for the 
police to enter the shared residence, she could not 
validly consent to a  search of what was considered 
exclusively the accused’s property: 
It cannot be said, on the totality of the 
circumstances, that the [accused] would have 
reasonably expected Ms.  Ferrer could validly 
consent to a police search through his tarp-
covered pile of property in which they found 
the firearms. Even though the pile was in the 
garage, generally a common area, it was a 
corner of the garage where his “stuff” was kept. 
Ms.  Ferrer recognized this property did not 
belong to her. She testified this part of the 
garage was strictly for the [accused’s] property 
and she did not look through it. The evidence 
reflects that Ms.  Ferrer had no privacy interest 
in the [accused’s] property, and it would be 
incorrect to infer the [accused] would have 
reasonably expected that she could authorize a 
police search through it. [para. 64]
Therefore, the trial judge erred in finding 
Ms.  Ferrer’s consent extended to authorizing the 
police to search through the goods in the garage 
and to seize the items they had no right to take. 
Here, the Crown tried to prove that the warrantless 
search was reasonable by impermissibly extending 
the effective scope of Ms.  Ferrer’s consent. “The 
evidence established that Ms. Ferrer had no privacy 
interest in the [accused’s] property in question,” 
said Justice MacKenzie. “Ms. Ferrer had no lawful 
authority to waive the [accused’s] reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area of the garage 
considered his, and in particular, in the  property 
searched and the firearms seized, by giving  consent 
or otherwise.” 
Thus, the police breached the accused’s s. 8 
Charter rights in searching and seizing his “stuff”.
Section 489(2) Criminal Code
Section 489(2) of the Criminal Code, the Crown’s 
alternative argument, did not authorize  the valid 
seizure of the accused’s property that was stored in 
the garage. “It is clear that s.  489(2) only permits 
seizure, not a search,” said the Court of Appeal. 
“The firearms were not visible or in ‘plain view’ in 
the garage. They were covered by a  pile of the 
[accused’s] other items, and a tarp. Because 
s.  489(2) does not authorize a search, it cannot 
serve as lawful authority for the  search of the pile of 
items that resulted in seizure of the firearms.”
s. 24(2) Charter
The evidence of the two firearms was properly 
admissible  under s.  24(2) of the Charter and their 
exclusion would result in greater harm to society’s 
confidence in the administration of justice than 
would their admission into evidence. First, the 
Charter violation was not serious. The police acted 
in good faith; they honestly believed that 
Ms.  Ferrer’s consent authorized them to conduct 
the search. Second, the impact of the breach on the 
Charter protected interests of the accused was low. 
He had a severely diminished expectation of 
privacy in his pile of items. Finally, society had a 
significant interest in the adjudication of this case 
on its merits. The guns were reliable evidence and 
critical to the Crown’s case. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“It is clear that s. 489(2) only permits seizure, not a search,” said the Court of Appeal. “The 
firearms were not visible or in ‘plain view’ in the garage. They were covered by a pile of the 
[accused’s] other items, and a tarp. Because s. 489(2) does not authorize a search, it cannot 
serve as lawful authority for the search of the pile of items that resulted in seizure of the firearms.”
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FACTORS INSUFFICIENT TO 
PROVIDE REASONABLE 
SUSPICION FOR DETENTION & 
K9 SNIFF
R. v. Urban, 2017 ABCA 436
 
The accused was driving a brown 
Dodge minivan on Highway 1, near 
Lake Louise, Alberta. A police officer 
working the Roving Traffic Unit 
noticed the minivan and entered its 
licence plate  into the Police  Information Portal 
(PIP). The results indicated that the name associated 
with the minivan—the accused—was also 
associated three times with addresses related to a 
marijuana grow operation in British Columbia. The 
officer followed the minivan but passed it when it 
took an unexpected exit into the village of Lake 
Louise. The officer radioed to other officers that a 
vehicle of interest might have entered the village. 
Within minutes, the  van was back on Highway 1 
and the officer followed it. He radioed to another 
officer that he did not have grounds to stop the 
minivan. This other officer radioed back  that he had 
run a check on the minivan and the results 
indicated that the vehicle should be white in 
colour. This officer radioed that he was going to 
stop the vehicle under Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act 
(TSA) 
The officer pulled the minivan over and advised the 
accused that he had been stopped because of the 
colour discrepancy with the vehicle. He asked for 
documentation and where the accused was coming 
from and going to. The accused said that he was 
travelling from Kelowna to Edmonton to help his 
pregnant sister with bathroom renovations. At this 
point the officer saw a box for a child’s car seat, a 
box of size three diapers, tools and equipment, and 
a small cooler on the floor of the front passenger 
seat. He believed that the car seat and the diapers 
were too large for a newborn baby and thus 
inconsistent with the accused’s story about visiting 
his pregnant sister. He also believed that the cooler 
was significant because  drug traffickers typically do 
not want to stop for food or leave their vehicle 
unattended.
The officer decided he had reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the accused was in possession of drugs 
and placed him under investigative detention. The 
officer read the accused the Charter caution and 
the accused waived his right to counsel. A police 
service dog was deployed to search the minivan’s 
perimeter and the dog’s response indicated 
controlled substances were inside it. The accused 
was arrested for possessing a controlled substance 
and re-read the Charter caution. The accused again 
declined to contact legal counsel. The interior of 
the minivan was searched and 38.16 lbs. of 
marijuana was found throughout the vehicle, 
including in the diaper box and the car seat box. 
The accused was charged with possessing cannabis 
for the purpose of trafficking.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued that the evidence 
seized by police after searching the 
minivan was obtained in violation of his 
ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) Charter rights and 
should be excluded under s 24(2).
The officer stopping the accused testified that he 
always asked questions during a  traffic  stop about 
where  someone was coming from and going to in 
order to determine whether the driver was fatigued 
or impaired. The accused submitted that it was 
improper for the officer to use his statement about 
his purpose for travel as a reason for suspecting him 
of possessing a controlled substance. In his view, 
answers provided to the police during the s. 10(b) 
suspension on the right to counsel permitted during 
a traffic  stop could not be  used as grounds to detain 
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him. As well, he contended that his s 10(b) rights 
were no longer suspended when he was asked 
where  he was going because, at that point, police 
were no longer detaining him for traffic safety 
reasons. Thus, his s. 10(b) rights were breached 
when the police failed to inform him of his right to 
consult counsel. The judge rejected this submission. 
She concluded that the  officer’s purpose for asking 
about the accused’s comings and goings was 
because  of a concern for traffic  safety – to find out 
whether the driver was fatigued because  he had 
driven a long way. Thus, the detention at that point 
was authorized under the TSA and the accused’s s. 
10(b) rights remained in abeyance.
The judge also ruled that the accused’s claims of an 
arbitrary  detention and an unreasonable search 
when the sniffer dog was used were without merit. 
She found the officer had reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the accused was in possession of an 
illegal substance and had the authority to conduct 
an investigative detention and a sniffer dog search. 
The judge found the following factors, considered 
cumulatively, in light of his training and experience 
provided the requisite reasonable suspicion:
1. The accused exited Highway 1 and returned to 
it shortly afterwards in a way that seemed 
illogical and possibly evasive;
2. The presence of the cooler and some food in 
the passenger seat, suggested that he did not 
want to leave the vehicle unattended;
3. The entries on the PIP system reported he had 
been associated with “three production of 
cannabis marijuana files” as “a property 
representative” in British Columbia;
4. The officer’s belief that the accused seemed to 
be taking a  route inconsistent with his stated 
destination. The constable later admitted in 
court that this was an incorrect belief;
5. The diapers and the car seat inside the vehicle 
seemed too large for a newborn baby and thus 
seemed inconsistent with the  accused’s story, 
and were commonly used as props for drug 
trafficking; and
6. The accused’s nervousness when he was 
initially  detained, to the point that his hands 
shook.
The items seized during the search were admitted 
into evidence and the accused was convicted of 
possessing marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing, in part, that 
his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights 
had been breached when he 
was placed under investigative detention for 
possessing a controlled substance and in deploying 
a sniffer dog to search the exterior of his vehicle. 
He also argued his s. 10(b) right was violated when 
police did not inform him of his right to counsel 
when the purpose of investigation changed from 
traffic safety to detection of crime. He wanted the 
evidence seized following the search of his vehicle 
excluded.
Reasonable Suspicion?
The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the 
grounds proffered in 
th i s case—(1) the 
cooler; (2) the two 
boxes for child’s car 
seat and diapers; (3) 
the PIP search results; 
(4) the accused’s brief exit from Highway 1; and (5) 
his apparent nervousness when initially detained— 
did not support a  reasonable suspicion that the 
accused was in possession of drugs even when 
“We recognize that the reasonable suspicion standard has become a low bar ...: an 
officer’s grounds need only objectively indicate a possibility that the suspect is 
committing a crime.
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assessed as a constellation and not on a one-by-one 
basis. The Court of Appeal stated:
Viewed in their entirety, though, do [the 
officer’s] grounds justify a reasonable suspicion 
of possession of illegal drugs? Four of the five 
factors are neutral or equally consistent with 
innocent behaviour as with criminal behaviour: 
the cooler, the nervousness, the exit from the 
highway, the PIP entries. Such factors on their 
own cannot justify a finding of reasonable 
suspicion although they may form part of a 
“constellation” of factors that together supports 
a reasonable suspicion. [The officer’s] 
observation of the boxes in the back seat of the 
car, together with his training and experience, 
provide some objective basis for suspecting 
[the accused] of possessing a controlled 
substance.
...
We recognize that the reasonable suspicion 
standard has become a low bar particularly 
since Chehil and MacKenzie: an officer’s 
grounds need only objectively indicate a 
possibility that the suspect is committing a 
crime.
The dictum in Chehil, at para 31, that 
innocuous factors that “go both ways” cannot 
support reasonable suspicion on their own but 
may when combined with other factors, should 
not be understood as endorsing a kind of 
alchemy whereby a group of severally 
innocuous factors somehow become grounds 
for reasonable suspicion when considered 
together. Individually innocuous factors do not 
support a reasonable suspicion when they are 
combined with other innocuous factors, unless 
one factor provides support to another or the 
innocuous factors, together, are mutually 
reinforcing. With that said, most of the factors 
relied on by [the officer] in this case were 
either neutral or “went both ways”.
We conclude, looking at the totality of the 
evidence through the lens of [the officer], with 
his training and experience in the detection of 
drugs, that the constable’s subjective belief that 
[the accused] might be involved in a 
drug-related offence was not objectively 
justified. Consequently, he lacked authority at 
common law to detain [the accused] for the 
purpose of a controlled substance investigation 
and to conduct a sniffer dog search of the 
exterior of [the accused’s] vehicle, thereby 
breaching [the accused’s] rights under s 9 
(arbitrary detention) and s 8 (unreasonable 
search and seizure) of the Charter. {references 
omitted, paras. 40-44]
Right to Counsel
Here, the officer stopped the accused to check his 
registration under the TSA. In doing so, it was 
assumed that his s 10(b) rights were suspended for 
the duration of the traffic stop. The accused argued 
that the officer’s question, after the initial stop, 
about where he was coming from and going to was 
not to investigate possible traffic safety violations 
but to detect criminal activity generally. In the 
accused’s opinion, when the officer asked the 
question his s. 10(b) rights were no longer 
suspended by  implicit operation of the TSA and he 
should have been advised of his right to consult 
counsel.
But this argument had been rejected by  the trial 
judge. She found that that the officer asked the 
question for a valid traffic safety  purpose – to find 
out whether the driver was fatigued - and for no 
other purpose such as to investigate crime 
generally. Nor was there a change in his jeopardy 
when the officer asked where he was going to and 
coming from such that he was now under 
investigation for a more serious crime. “In this case, 
the purpose of the initial stop was to investigate an 
apparent discrepancy in [the accused’s] registration 
and the purpose of the question about [the 
accused’s] comings and goings was to find out if 
[the accused] was too fatigued to drive safely,” said 
the Court of Appeal. “[His] jeopardy did not change 
between these two events.”
In sum, the accused’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter  rights 
were breached but not his s. 10(b) right. Since the 
trial judge did not address whether the evidence 
should be  excluded under s 24(2), the accused and 
Crown were given time to file  written submissions 
on the admissibility of the evidence.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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SENDER MAINTAINED PRIVACY 
INTEREST IN TEXT MESSAGE ON 
RECIPIENT’s PHONE
R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59
 
The accused sent text messages to 
his accomplice about the illegal 
purchase and sale of firearms. The 
police obtained warrants to search 
his home and the home of his 
accomplice. The accused’s BlackBerry was seized 
and searched. His accomplice's iPhone was also 
seized and searched. Incriminating  text messages 
were found. The accused was charged with firearms 
offences and the Crown sought to use  the text 
messages as evidence against him. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the warrant for the 
accused’s residence was invalid and the 
text messages recovered from his 
Blackberry should not be admitted as 
evidence against him because  they were obtained 
in violation of his s. 8 Charter right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure. The judge 
also found the search of the accomplice’s iPhone 
breached the Charter. However, the judge ruled 
that the  accused had no standing to argue that the 
text messages recovered from his accomplice’s 
iPhone should not be admitted. The text messages 
on the accomplice’s iPhone were admitted as 
evidence against the accused and he was convicted 
on two counts of trafficking in firearms, conspiracy 
to traffic  in firearms, possession of a loaded 
restricted firearm and possession of a firearm 
without a valid licence. He was sentenced to nine 
years in prison, less pre-sentence custody. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
A majority of the Court of 
Appeal agreed with the  trial 
judge that the accused had no 
expectation of privacy in the 
text messages recovered from his accomplice’s 
iPhone, and therefore did not have standing  to 
argue against their  admissibility. The accused’s 
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appeal was dismissed and his convictions were 
upheld.
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused argued that 
h e d i d h a v e a 
reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the text 
messages he sent to his accomplice  and therefore 
had standing to argue that his s. 8 Charter rights 
were breached when the police searched and 
accessed the text messages on his accomplice’s 
iPhone. In his view, those messages ought to have 
been excluded under s. 24(2).
To claim s. 8 Charter protection, an accused must 
first establish they had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the subject matter of the search. This 
requires an analysis of whether the accused 
subjectively expected it would be private and 
whether this expectation was objectively 
reasonable. 
Chief Justice McLachlin, authoring the four member 
majority opinion, concluded that the accused, as 
sender of the test messages, did retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in those text messages on the 
recipient's phone, in this case his accomplice. 
Therefore, the accused had standing to argue that 
his s. 8 rights had been violated when the police 
accessed the text messages on his accomplice’s 
iPhone. 
A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Text 
Messages
Describing the  subject matter of the search as an 
“electronic conversation”, the majority stated:
Indeed, it is difficult to think of a type of 
conversation or communication that is capable 
of promising more privacy than text messaging. 
Th e r e i s n o m o r e d i s c r e e t f o r m o f 
correspondence. Participants need not be in the 
same physical place; in fact, they almost never 
are. ...
One can even text privately in plain sight. A 
wife has no way of knowing that, when her 
husband appears to be catching up on emails, 
he is in fact conversing by text message with a 
paramour. A father does not know whom or 
what his daughter is texting at the dinner table. 
Electronic conversations can allow people to 
communicate details about their activities, their 
relationships, and even their identities that they 
would never reveal to the world at large, and to 
enjoy portable privacy in doing so.
Electronic conversations, in sum, are capable of 
revealing a great deal of personal information. 
Preservation of a “zone of privacy” in which 
personal information is safe from state intrusion 
is the very purpose of s. 8 of the Charter. As the 
foregoing examples illustrate, this zone of 
privacy extends beyond one’s own mobile 
TEXT MESSAGES
“Electronic Conversation”
“[I]t is difficult to think of a type of 
conversation or communication that is 
capable of promising more privacy than 
text messaging. There is no more discreet 
form of correspondence. Participants 
need not be in the same physical place; in 
fact, they almost never are.”
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device; i t can include the electronic 
conversations in which one shares private 
information with others. It is reasonable to 
expect these private interactions — and not just 
the contents of a particular cell phone at a 
particular point in time — to remain private. 
[paras. 35-37]
The majority then went on to conclude that, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, the accused 
had an objectively  reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the electronic conversation he had with 
his accomplice:
Each of the three factors relevant to this inquiry 
in this case, place, capacity to reveal personal 
information, and control, support this 
conclusion. If the place of the search is viewed 
as a private electronic space accessible by only 
[the accused] and [his accomplice], [the 
accused’s] reasonable expectation of privacy is 
clear. If the place of the search is viewed as 
[the accomplice's] phone, this reduces, but 
does not negate, [the accused’s] expectation of 
privacy. The mere fact of the electronic 
conversation between the two men tended to 
reveal personal information about [the 
accused’s] lifestyle; namely, that he was 
engaged in a criminal enterprise. This the 
police could glean when they had done no 
more than scrolled through [the accomplice’s] 
messages and identified [the accused] as one of 
his correspondents. In addition, [the accused] 
exercised control over the informational 
content of the electronic conversation and the 
manner in which information was disclosed. 
Therefore, [the accused] has standing to 
challenge the search and the admission of the 
evidence, even though the state accessed his 
electronic conversation with [his accomplice] 
through the latter’s iPhone. This conclusion is 
not displaced by policy concerns. [references 
omitted, para. 54]
In the  majority’s view, control was not the sole 
determining factor in assessing privacy but only one 
factor to be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances. 
What Should the Police to do?
Chief Justice McLachlin suggested there  were three 
scenarios where text messages in which an accused 
could establish a reasonable expectation of privacy 
could be permitted into evidence:
1. With Warrant. The  police could obtain a 
warrant prior to accessing the text messages. 
2. Without warrant. Although warrantless 
searches are presumptively unreasonable, the 
Crown could establish on a  balance of 
probabilities that the search was authorized by 
law, the law was reasonable  and the search 
was carried out in a reasonable manner.
3. s. 24(2) of the Charter. Even where the police 
breach an accused’s s. 8 right, the Crown 
could argue that the evidence should be 
admitted under s. 24(2) 
Admissibility in this Case
The Crown conceded that the search was 
unreasonable if the accused had standing (a 
reasonable expectation of privacy). Thus, the text 
messages were subject to exclusion under s. 24(2). 
Although society’s interest in the adjudication of 
the case  on its merits was significant and favoured 
inclusion of the  evidence, both the Charter-
infringing conduct was sufficiently serious and the 
impact on the accused’s Charter-protected privacy 
interest was significant to favour exclusion. Both 
these factors favoured exclusion. The majority 
excluded the text messages from being used as 
evidence against the accused. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were set aside and acquittals were entered on all 
charges.  
A Concurring Opinion
Justice Rowe agreed with the Chief Justice 
that the  accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the text 
messages on his accomplice’s iPhone and 
therefore standing to argue his s. 8 Charter rights 
were breached. However, he was concerned with 
the consequences of this decision:
If the sender has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the record of his digital conversation, 
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what happens when the recipient wants to 
show that record to the police? Are we opening 
the door to challenges by senders of text 
messages to the voluntary disclosure of those 
messages by recipients? As Justice Moldaver 
suggests, this would lead to the perverse result 
where the voluntary disclosure of text messages 
received by a complainant could be challenged 
by a sender who is alleged to have abused the 
complainant. Furthermore, what Justice 
Moldaver refers to as large project prosecutions 
— often with multiple accused allegedly 
involved in organized crime — would become 
more complex and might collapse under their 
own weight if each accused gains standing to 
challenge the admissibility of messages 
received by any other person involved in the 
alleged offence. I see no way within the 
confines of this case to deal with these 
concerns, as they do not arise here on the facts. 
I would say only that principle and practicality 
must not be strangers in the application of s. 8 
or we might well thwart justice in the course of 
seeking to achieve it. [para. 89]
A Different View: Control Carries the Day
Justice Moldaver, with whom Justice 
Côté agreed, concluded that the 
accused had no control whatsoever 
over the text conversations on his 
accomplice’s iPhone and therefore had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in those 
messages. His accomplice had complete autonomy 
over those conversations and was free to disclose 
them to anyone he wished, at any time and for any 
purpose. “Control is inseparable from the concept 
of privacy,” he said. “A total absence of control is 
therefore a compelling indicator that there is no 
reasonable expectation of personal privacy.” Justice 
Moldaver continued:
When assessing the objective reasonableness of 
a claimant’s expectation of personal privacy in 
the subject matter of a search, the claimant’s 
control over the subject matter is vital. The 
standing inquiry is concerned with a claimant’s 
personal connection to the subject matter in the 
circumstances of the case. Control plays an 
integral role in defining the strength of that 
connection. [para. 122]
Since the accused had absolutely  no control over 
the text messages on his accomplice’s phone, 
Justice Moldaver concluded that the accused could 
not reasonably expect personal privacy in those text 
messages. Thus, the accused lacked standing  to 
challenge the search of his accomplice’s phone and 
the police access to those text messages. The 
minority would have dismissed the  accused’s 
appeal and upheld his convictions. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
Editor’s Note: It will be interesting  to see the 
impact of this case on law enforcement’s ability to 
access (search for and seize) text messages. There 
was little guidance provided to the police in 
situations that fall outside  the fact pattern in this 
case. Remember, this case was about two co-
conspirator’s communicating by text messages. The 
accused was not sending text messages to a 
random person or to a person he thought would 
disclose them. Furthermore, it cannot be forgotten 
that the police search of both the accused’s phone 
and his accomplice’s phone was not Charter 
compliant. In other words, neither phone was 
lawfully searched. Had either phone been lawfully 
searched, either with or without a warrant, this 
editor believes the  outcome in this case would have 
been different. 
This is consistent with the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal’s majority approach in R. v. Pelluco, 2015 
BCCA 370 which stated that “a person cannot have 
a reasonable expectation that messages on another 
person’s cellphone will remain private in the face of 
a lawful search of the  device.” In other words, the 
distinction between a lawful search and an 
unlawful one is important. The Pelluco majority 
found the accused was entitled to expect that the 
police would not search the messages on his 
accomplice's phone without lawful authority and, 
when they did search without authorization, they 
breached the accused’s s. 8 Charter right.
The majority in Marakah, as well, did not hold that 
a sender of a text message will always retain a 
reasonable  expectation of privacy in the text 
message residing on the recipient’s phone. Chief 
Justice McLachlin could not have made this much 
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clearer when she said, “The conclusion that a text 
message conversation can, in some circumstances, 
attract a reasonable expectation of privacy does not 
lead inexorably to the conclusion that an exchange 
of electronic messages will always attract a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.” Thus, there is 
no doubt that whether or not a sender of a text 
message has a privacy interest in the text as it exists 
on the  recipient’s phone will be assessed on a case-
by-case basis.
For example, in the British Columbia case of R. v. 
Sandhu, 2014 BCSC 303, the accused sent 
threatening  text messages. The recipient gave the 
police his cellphone, and they attempted to enter 
the text messages into evidence at trial. The trial 
judge held that the  police violated the accused’s 
s.  8 rights in reading the messages without 
obtaining a warrant. This reasoning was found to be 
in error by a majority in Pelluco (as cited above), 
which stated that  Sandhu’s  belief his threatening 
text messages would be kept private was not 
objectively reasonable:
It is because the objective reasonableness of an 
expectation of privacy includes normative 
elements that I am of the view that the analysis 
in Sandhu cannot be sustained. In that case, the 
judge found that the sender of a threatening 
text message had an objectively reasonable 
expectation that the recipient would not turn 
the message over to police. If objective 
reasonableness were merely a measure of 
probability, it could be said that the sender had 
an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy – he could reasonably expect that the 
threat would be sufficient to silence the victim 
and his message would, therefore, remain 
pr ivate. Once normative elements of 
reasonableness are recognized, however, it 
becomes clear that a person who threatens 
another has no right to expect that the person 
who has been threatened will keep the threat 
private. [Pelluco at para. 61]
What are  some lawful means to search a cellphone 
without a warrant? The police may, depending  on 
the circumstances, lawfully search a cellphone as 
an incident to a lawful arrest (eg. R. v. Fearon, 2014 
SCC 77). It should be noted that in the Marakah 
case, the Crown failed to justify the  search of the 
accomplice’s iPhone as an incident to arrest and 
Crown conceded its search to be unreasonable 
once the standing issue was decided.  
Another issue that was discussed, but left largely 
unresolved, was whether the recipient of a text 
message could voluntarily consent to its disclosure 
to police. Justice Moldaver opined that the 
majority’s ruling  suggested that the  police may 
require a  warrant even where a victim voluntarily 
provides the text message to police. He wrote:
Under the Chief Justice’s approach, where 
police search a cellphone or other device for 
an electronic communication, any participant 
to that communication would have standing to 
challenge the lawfulness of the search. The 
same may be true even where a witness 
voluntarily shares an electronic communication 
with the police, as there remains uncertainty in 
the law as to whether reception by police of 
this evidence amounts to a search engaging s. 8 
of the Charter. As such, in these circumstances, 
s. 8 may be engaged and a search warrant may 
well be necessary to comply with s. 8. Indeed, 
the Chief Justice appears to concede that police 
may require a warrant even where a victim or 
his or her parents voluntarily provide police 
with threatening or offensive text messages. 
[references omitted, para. 181]
But can the recipient of a text message voluntarily 
provide that message to police? A consent search, it 
could be argued, would fit within Chief Justice 
McLachlin’s second scenario of justifying the 
warrantless search of text messages through a 
search authorized by law. Assuming both parties to 
a text message share a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, like those who share a privacy interest in 
common areas of a  home for example, why could 
one party not voluntarily provide those shared text 
messages to police just as the co-habitant of a 
dwelling can consent to the police to enter and 
search common areas (eg. R. v. Reeves, 2017 
ONCA 365, R. v. Clarke, 2017 BCCA 453, R. v. 
Parsons, 2017 NLCA 64), provided such consent is 
voluntary and fully informed? Undoubtedly, the 
issue of a consent search of text messages will arise 
in cases in the not too distant future. This editor 
suspects that Marakah will not be the final word on 
accessing text messages of a recipient's phone!
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